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Participation of Belarus in the Euro-Asian Oil-Trans-
portation Corridor (EAOTC) will depend on how 
soon the national oil-refineries (NOR) of Belarus 
will face a shortage of Russian raw materials.
Escalation of the relations with Russia in 2007 
called forth by the changes in the conditions of the 
supply of the Russian oil into the country made the 
Belarusian authorities perceive that it was wrong 
to be fully dependent on Russian energy resources. 
The country has to think of the national security, 
including economic and energy security.
In early 2007 the official Minsk made many 
statements related to its plans to find alterna-
tives to the Russian oil supply. The energy secu-
rity concept of Belarus foresaw that by 2010 20 
% of total demand for oil will be supplied with 
energy resources alternative to Russian ones. 
 
Statements and the Reality
New conditions for the supply of Russian energy 
resources made the Belarusian authorities look for 
oil hastily in all parts of the globe – in Venezuela, 
UAE, Iran and Azerbaijan. 
Two years ago Ambassador of Belarus to Lithuania 
Vladimir Drazhin went so far as to voice the exact 
figure – according to him, starting with 2008 Belarus 
will be purchasing 7 million tons of alternative oil 
(today the demand of the country for oil makes up 
21.5 million tons). The supply, as V. Drazhin pointed 
out at that time, could have started in 2008 while 
Month after month relations between Belarus 
and Russia become more and more compulsive. 
This time the ban on import of Belarusian diary 
products imposed by Russia has triggered a wave 
of accusations and mutual irritation. Each side has 
resorted to its strongest trump: Belarus has imposed 
customs control and Russia has threatened with a 
gas war. Although it is recently claimed that a new 
energy war is clearly underway, one may assume 
that a more ‘subtle’ solution of the problem might be 
found. Like the oil sector, gas transportation system 
in Belarus has not been yet entirely privatized by 
Russia. Drawing conclusions from the contribution 
by Tatiana Manenok, who claims that in the near 
future the drying up of the oil pipelines in Belarus 
will be avoided only if Belarusian Druzhba together 
with national oil refineries is privatized, one can 
anticipate similar payoff instead of suspension of 
gas supply to Belarus. 
The problem over the diary products export to 
Russia is not the sole one that concerns Ministry of 
Economy of Belarus as well as all the ‘crisis fighters’. 
Much less speculated but not least important is 
the fact that one of the main export sectors – the 
rural household enginery – suffers from harshly 
shrinking volumes of export to Russia. Thus tough 
negotiations with Russian officials are one side of 
the coin when speaking of anti-crisis measures. The 
other side is the word ‘liberalization’. It has become 
‘magic’ since too much can go into it. At the same 
time it is like a curse since everybody is talking 
about it but not everyone conceives what it really 
means in Belarus. The article by Sergei Nikoliuk 
offers a sociological explanation of the process of 
liberalization in Belarus.
In turmoil of political developments in Belarus 
a number of events have been overshadowed or 
not paid enough attention to. One of them is A. 
Milinkevich’s announcement of his intentions 
to summon a congress of pro-European forces. 
An analysis by Pavel Usov presents an analytical 
evaluation of such a positive - on the face of it - 
development. 
Belarus is among the few not maritime countries. 
However, its authorities often find themselves 
swimming in stormy waters. Quite frequently they 
give an impression of sailors without a compass. 
So does the opposition.    
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor 
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by 2010 Belarus planned to obtain 5 million tons 
per year in Venezuela.
Vilnius was prepared to accept the Belarusian 
proposal should it have been made officially. The 
1st secretary of the Embassy of Lithuania in Belarus 
Vidmantas Verbickas stressed that the implemen-
tation of the project of oil supply to Belarus via 
Lithuania would depend on the interest of the 
Belarusian party in the long-term cooperation since 
the resolution of the given issue would demand 
additional investments (quite large at that) of the 
Lithuanian companies into the infrastructure of the 
Klaipeda port and Butinge oil terminal.
Lithuania, however, failed to receive any official 
proposal on the technical cooperation in the field 
of oil transit via Klaipeda and Butinge. Apart from 
Lithuanian direction, official Minsk declared in early 
2007 about the possible transit of oil to Belarus via 
Latvian port Ventspils. The first vice-Prime Minister 
of the Government Vladimir Semashko spoke at 
the meeting in Novopolotsk in late January about 
the options of the oil supply by the pipeline Surgut 
– Unecha – Polotsk – Ventspils in the reverse direc-
tion to supply Naftan with raw oil, which might be 
coming from the ports of the Baltic States. The given 
pipeline is at a standstill from 2003 when Russia 
terminated the supply of oil via Latvia.
But the Latvian party also failed to receive any 
official proposals from Minsk to implement the 
given project.
Kiev Attempts to Boost the 
Implementation of the EAOTC
In the wake of the oil-gas conflict with Russia in 2007 
the subject of the supply of the Caspian oil to Belarus 
was made topical. The given issue was discussed 
in early May 2009 in Gomel during the talks of the 
President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenka and the 
President of the Ukraine Victor Yushchenko. That 
was said openly to journalists by the President of 
Ukraine. At present V. Yushchenko tries to speed 
up the reversal to the European direction of the 
pipeline Odessa-Brody1, which initially was planned 
as a part of the EAOTC for the transportation of 
Caspian oil to Europe. 
On 14 May 2009 V. Yushchenko approved the plan 
for the implementation of the EAOTC project, 
which is an alternative to the already existing route 
of the Caspian oil supply to Europe. The document 
informs that Ukraine is prepared to accept Belarus, 
1 Oil pipeline Odessa-Brody is constructed between 
Odessa and Brody (Lvov district) towns and is in the 
close proximity to the oil pipeline Druzhba. Initial-
ly the project was meant to transit Caspian oil to Cen-
tral Europe and in the future to the Baltic Sea ports.
       Its construction was completed in May 2002. The arte-
rial pipeline is 674 km long the diameter of the pipe is 
1.020 mm. The annual capacity of the first line of the pipe-
line and the terminal amounts to 9-14 million tons of oil.
       From the very beginning of construction Ukraine un-
successfully attempted to negotiate the transporta-
tion of the Caspian oil by it in the direct operation re-
gime. At the end of June 2004 the Ukrainian Government 
gave the permission to make use of the pipeline for the 
transportation of Russian oil in the reverse direction.
Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovakia and Czech Republic 
to the implementation of the given project.
In accordance with the plan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Mintopenergo, Neftegaz Ukrainy and Uk-
transneft have to work out a resolution related to 
the given issue in June this year.
In August preparation of the conditions for the use 
of the oil pipeline Odessa-Brody in the planned 
regime - to transport oil to the Ukrainian and 
foreign oil refineries - is planned.
In September the Cabinet of Ministers has to pass 
a decision related to the exploitation of the pipeline 
Odessa-Brody in the designed direction by taking 
into account the Technical-Economic Substantia-
tion (TES) of the EAOTC and results of the talks 
with the interested partners.
At present the project of the EAOTC is being im-
plemented by the Polish-Ukrainian international 
pipeline enterprise Sarmatia stakeholders of which 
are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland and 
the Ukraine.
According to the project the pipeline Odessa-Brody 
has to start operating in an averse regime and has 
to be extended to Poland (it operates in the reverse 
regime since late 2004 and supplies around 9 million 
tons of Russian oil to the port Yuzhnij). Already in 
June the Cabinet of Ministers, Neftegaz Ukrainy 
and Ukratransneft have to initiate the issue of 
the enlargement of the authorized capital of the 
enterprise Sarmatia. In July the acceleration of 
the activities to attract additional investments in 
the project are planned, including the setting up 
of the international investment fund.
The project Odessa-Brody has already many times 
been at the stage of preparedness. The main issue, 
however, has always been the issue of the raw ma-
terial for the pipeline. And although the situation 
with the raw materials in principle failed to change, 
nevertheless, the Ukrainian President is obstinate 
in pushing the given project forward.
On 24 April 2009 in Warsaw the general meeting 
of the shareholders of the five-lateral International 
Oil Transport Enterprise Sarmatia approved the 
TES of the given project, whereby the availability of 
the sufficient amount of oil for the implementation 
of the project had been approved. Thus, extraction 
of oil in the Caspian region till 2015 has to grow 
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Picture 1.  
The Euro-Asian Oil Transporting Corridor. 
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by 100 million tons per year and in the period till 
2025 – by 150 million tons per year. The demand 
of light oil from the Caspian region along the route 
of EAOTC will amount to no less than 30 million 
tons per year.
Those calculations seem to have been made by 
taking into account the Kazakhstan oil. However, 
Kazakhstan - the main potential supplier of oil for 
the Odessa-Brody pipeline in an averse regime – 
has not joined the project officially. President of 
Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev is quoted to 
have said that Kazakhstan ‘has the potential to 
meet the needs of the Ukraine in energy carri-
ers’ and ‘is willing to do it’ but is careful to avoid 
conflict with Moscow and insists on the talks with 
its participation. Since it is namely Kazakhstan 
oil that should fill the Russian project Burgas – 
Alexandropoli pipeline, the potential competitor 
whereof is Odessa-Brody.
So far it is only Azerbaijan that is prepared to supply 
oil to the new route. President of Azerbaijan Ilham 
Aliev confirmed that Azerbaijan is in possession of 
around 5 million tons of oil per year. Azerbaijan has 
its own interests. The Azerbaijan party counts on the 
receiving of assets outside Azerbaijan as well as on 
the entrance into the EU market and the markets of 
the EU-adjacent countries. The Ukrainian project 
in this sense is a good opportunity.
Keeping in mind the present absence of raw oil 
supply guarantees the project Odessa-Brody ap-
proved in Warsaw is split into some stages. The 
initial stage provides for the transportation of 5 
to 10 million tons of Caspian oil per year to the 
Ukrainian, Austrian and Polish oil refineries. It has 
been noted that at the given stage no considerable 
additional capital investments into the project will 
be needed.
The second and the third stages provide for the 
gradual construction of new objects of the infra-
structure along all routes of the EAOTC for the 
gradual increase of the transportation of oil up to 
20 million, 30 million and over 40 million of tons 
per year. The scope of investments at the given stage 
ranges from USD 2 billion to USD 8 billion in ac-
cordance with the transit capacities and needs.
Kiev views the implementation of the EAOTC 
project quite optimistically. ‘I hope that in about 
two months we, 6 Presidents, will submit the given 
project to Brussels. And we will start its implementa-
tion as one of the most cost-effective in the supply 
of energy carriers’, - the newspaper Ukrainskaja 
Pravda of 3 April 2009 quoted V. Yushchenko. 
However, at the energy summit in Vilnius in Oc-
tober 2007 the project related to the linking of the 
Ukrainian ‘pipe’ Odessa - Brody with the Polish 
town Plotsk and the seaport Gdansk on the Baltic 
Sea, which will become an alternative to the oil 
supply from Russia, was supported by five Presi-
dents – of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland 
and the Ukraine.
Who V. Yushchenko had in mind being the 6th 
President - N. Nazarbajev or maybe A. Lukashenka? 
Both candidates raise doubts – the first as well as 
the second.
Belarusian Interest
It has already been a long time since Belarus was 
invited to participate in the creation of the new 
route for the transportation of the Caspian oil in 
the direction of Europe, which would also enable 
Belarus to have an alternative corridor for the 
supply of alternative oil. The issue is related to the 
broadening of the project by way of connecting the 
oil pipeline Druzhba2 to it.
Last year Poland invited Belarus to join the club 
to complete the construction of the oil pipeline 
Odessa-Brody. Minsk, however, never joined the 
given project officially although the Belarusian party 
has a strong interest in it. 
There are technical facilities to ‘include’ the new 
route of the Caspian oil into the existing grid 
of Belarusian oil pipelines. To this end a ‘cross-
piece’ between the pipelines of Odessa-Brody and 
Druzhba has to be constructed on the Belarusian 
territory. In the long run this corridor might be 
used to transport Caspian oil not only to Belarus 
but to Lithuania and Latvia as well. Although the 
energy security concept of Belarus includes the 
given project as a route to supply alternative oil, 
the Belarusian party so far maintains a certain 
distance and carries out only the monitoring of 
the given issue.
Scepticism of Belarusian professionals is called forth 
by the stance of Kazakhstan on the participation 
in the project Sarmatia. They argue that in the 
absence of Kazakhstan oil the European oil pipeline 
will never reach ultimate output.
Still, the main reason of such reserve to the given 
project is different: today no country can ensure 
2 Russian oil via Belarus is transited by means of the oil pipeline 
Druzhba, which has two directions – southern (RUE Gomelt-
ransneft Druzhba), through which oil is transported to Poland 
and the Ukraine and northern (Novopolotsk Republican Unitary 
Enterprise for Transportation of Oil Druzhba) – to this pipeline 
oil was pumped from Surgut and Unechi and further on to the 
Lithuanian Oil Refinery Mazeikiu nafta and Butinge terminal. 
Since 29 July 2006 Russia terminated the supply of oil via Be-
larus to Lithuania. Since 1 January 2003 the transit of Russian 
oil by means of Novopolotsk Druzhba to Latvia was cancelled. 
Transit supply of Russian oil by means of RUE Gomeltransneft 
Druzhba amounted to around 64 million tons in 2008.
Picture 2.  
The pipeline Burgas – Alexandropoli. 
6  ( 6 ) ,  J u n e  2 0 0 9
4
Belarusian Druzhba 
will not dry up only if 
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is privatized and 
Russian Transneft. 
more profitable supply of oil to Belarus than Rus-
sia.
It is evident that as long as Russia is interested in 
the supply of oil to the Belarusian refineries for 
prices that are considerably lower than the world 
ones the official Minsk would hardly show any real 
support to the alternative project. It is also evident 
that the participation of Belarus in the given project 
is the problem of the choice between Russia and 
the West. The problem is, first and foremost, the 
price of the given choice. The basic criterion of the 
search for alternative sources of oil for Belarus has 
always been the economic efficiency.
Belarusian officials also invariably point to the 
fact that in accordance with the energy security 
concept alternative supply of oil to the country has 
to be regarded only in terms of its economic and 
ecological expediency.
In December 2008 the given issue was taken up again 
at the meeting of the working group for cooperation 
in the energy field between the Ukraine and Belarus. 
The discussions resulted in the Belarusian officials 
delivering the following verdict: the possibility of 
the implementation of the given project in the near 
foreseeable future is considered to be slim due to 
the absence of the approved resource basis.
It is evident that as long as Russia supplies the 
Belarusian oil refineries with cheap oil the issue of 
alternative supplies will never come to the fore.
Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) 
as Energy Stimulus
The process may be accelerated by the decision to 
construct an alternative to Belarusian Druzhba 
transit pipeline – Baltic Pipeline System-2 (BPS-
2)3 the construction of which got underway on 
June 10th. 
The resolution on the construction of BPS-2 by-
passing Belarus was signed by the Prime Minister 
of Russia Vladimir Putin as early as November 
of 2008. That decision was taken in the wake of 
the Russian-Belarusian oil conflict in 2007, which 
resulted in the slowing down of the transit of oil 
via Belarus into the European countries. Not long 
ago Reuters released an unbiased statement that the 
oil pipeline BPS-2 with its 50 million tons capacity 
would allow Russia to forsake fully the transit of 
oil via the territory of Belarus by substitution of 
the present oil pipeline Druzhba whereby Russian 
oil is supplied via Belarus to Germany and East 
European countries.
3 The framework of the project BPS-2 provides for the construc-
tion of the 1170 km long arterial pipeline with the capacity of 50 
million tons of oil per year (the capacity at the first stage is 30 
million tons), 7 oil pump stations, reconstruction of the exist-
ing OPS Unecha, OPS Andreapol and the construction of 172 
km long branching to the Kirishskiy OR.
Completion of the second stage of the construction of the pipe-
line BPS-2 and the increase of its capacity to 50 million tons per 
year is planned for December 2013. The first stage, which pre-
supposes the construction of the starting complex of 30 million 
tons capacity, has to be completed by September 2012.
So far it is not clear where Belarus will end up after 
the construction of BPS-2 in the future – decrease 
of transit or complete drying up of the Belarusian 
pipes. Are there any reasons to assume that Druzhba 
may become completely shallow? It goes without 
saying that this extreme scenario is possible only 
in the case when Russia builds BPS-2 and fills it up 
with oil from the Belarusian Druzhba.
In spring of 2008 the Russian company Transneft 
proposed a pattern of filling BPS-2 up, which is a 
compromise with respect to Belarus. It was assumed 
that 19 million tons of oil, which would be available 
after the supply to the Ukrainian ports Yuzhnij and 
Odessa had been cancelled, would be used to fill 
up BPS-2, additional 12 million were intended to 
be taken from the Surgutneftegaz reserves at the 
expense of cancelling the supply of those volumes 
from the existing export directions. Further plans 
were to obtain 10 million tons by increasing the 
volume of oil transit from Kazakhstan, 7 million 
– as a result of the cancellation of the supply to 
the Polish port Gdansk and 2 million tons at the 
expense of the decrease of oil supply by railway 
from the oil pump station Unecha in the direction 
of Belarus.
It is not clear so far whether this half-measure plan 
will be implemented or the situation will develop 
according to a much tougher scenario. Taking into 
account the pragmatic policy of Russia oriented to 
the construction of its own transit corridors it may 
be assumed that Belarusian Druzhba will not dry up 
only if it together with NOR is privatized and Rus-
sian Transneft will be able to control their activities. 
In any case, Belarusian authorities accelerated the 
drafting of documents to issue stock of Druzhba 
and intend to do it in 2009 although earlier priva-
tization of the pipeline was prohibited. 
Apart from increasing the capacities of BPS-2, 
however, Russia started the construction of a 
grand oil pipeline in the eastern direction Eastern 
Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) (rus. Vostochnaja 
Sibir - Tichij Okean). Besides, Transneft is active 
in increasing the export via the Russian port in 
Primorsk, Novorosiysk, Visotsk, Tuapse.
At present the construction of the oil pipeline Burgas 
– Alexandropoli is underway, which will not only 
Picture 3.  
The oil pipeline Baltic Pipeline System – 2. 
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enable to decrease the workload of Novorosiysk 
but will also increase the supply to South Europe 
by 30 million tons of oil per year.
Most probably, West Siberian oil, which is at present 
pumped to Belarus, will have to be redirected to 
the oil pipeline ESPO constructed in the direction 
of China since there might be the shortage of oil to 
fill it up. According to the forecasts of Russian and 
international experts, the first stage will require a 
redirection of the export flows going at present to 
Europe. This means annual diversion of around 30 
million tons of oil. This will inevitably result either in 
the prices going up for Russian oil, or Russia will lose 
part of its traditional European market. Since the 
new direction appears to be economically attractive, 
old markets, including Belarus, might suffer.
The first deputy Minister of fuel and energy of the 
Ukraine Oleg Bugaev anticipating the prospects 
of the drying up of Druzhba declared in January 
this year that as an alternative for such a prospect 
Ukraine and Belarus have to prepare the Belaru-
sian oil pipeline Druzhba for the operation in an 
averse regime.
Commenting on the situation deputy Minister of 
Economy of Belarus Anatoly Filonov stated that 
Russian oil resources are really not limitless and 
the possibilities of the supply of Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan oil to the Belarusian oil refineries have 
to be studied. He noted that so far the participation 
of Belarus in the project of EAOTC is non-existent. 
He failed to exclude, however, the fact that in the 
long run the given project might become interest-
ing for Belarus.
Enjoying the most preferential conditions for the 
supply of oil to the country in all post-soviet space 
and fearing the exasperation of Moscow Minsk can 
hardly be expected to state publicly about its inten-
tions to participate in the alternative project.
Nevertheless, it becomes evident that taking into 
account the political decision of Russia on the 
construction of the alternative to the Belarusian oil 
pipeline BPS-2 and the forced construction of ESPO 
the Belarusian party will study in great detail the 
possible alternative scenarios for the supply of oil 
to the NOR so that it could, if the necessity arises, 
make use of the new corridor of raw materials.  
Picture 3.  
The oil pipeline Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean. 
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a . m i l i n k e v i C h :  
t h i r d  F O r C e  W i t h  n O  F O r C e ?
Pavel Usov, New Europe
The intentions of Alexander Milinkevich to summon 
a Congress of Pro-European Forces have triggered 
a violent and hardly positive reaction from the 
Belarusian democratic community.  Representa-
tives of opposition parties comprising The United 
Democratic Forces (UDF) have given particularly 
harsh assessments. 
A. Milinkevich and his supporters are primarily 
accused of allegedly splitting the Belarusian opposi-
tion and that his actions and political rhetoric to a 
certain extent ‘legitimize’ the Lukashenka’s regime 
in the eyes of the West. There is even a specula-
tion that A. Lukashenka has entered into a ‘secret 
agreement’ with A. Milinkevich as an oppositional 
politician loyal to the regime. In the long run this 
agreement is said to reserve him a ‘good seat’ in 
the government. 
All these accusations and speculations would be 
grounded if the opposition had been united indeed 
– then it would be possible to talk about a split - 
and if the existing regime was in need of its own 
legitimization and A. Milinkevich’s assistance. 
To understand and analyze the current political 
situation in Belarus one has to consider several 
statements that essentially are axioms.
First, the Belarusian opposition resides in the 
permanent state of disunity, which has become an 
inalienable characteristic of its political existence. 
The unification of the opposition into a single 
political camp is impossible either now or in the 
foreseeable future.
Second, in the framework of the Belarusian demo-
cratic and oppositional movement the promotion 
of a single leader who would be unanimously ac-
knowledged by the entire democratic community 
and would become a feasible alternative to A. 
Lukashenka is impossible.
Third, a temporary unification of the opposition may 
take place only given the pressure from the Western 
partners. However, this unification while integral 
in shape will be split in essence, which paralyzes 
all efforts in the struggle with the regime.
Last but not least, the Belarusian political regime 
cannot be democratized from the outside, while the 
present leadership of the country will not concede 
to internal political changes.
A. Milinkevich’s actions cannot be referred to as 
actions directed at the split of the united opposition, 
since the phenomenon of ‘the united Belarusian 
opposition’ does not exist. Even in the good old 
times when there indeed was a minor opportunity 
to influence the political situation in the country, 
the disparate oppositional parties could not arrive 
at a compromise and design a common ideological 
and political platform. There always were secession-
ists who would lure part of the active population. 
Meanwhile, in the current situation there is no one 
who could be lured. The confidence rate as well as 
readiness of the population to support candidates 
from the opposition does not exceed 8%. The only 
thing left to the democratic leaders, A. Milinkevich 
included, is to ‘win’ supporters away from traditional 
oppositional parties by pretending to be the ‘third 
force’. What A. Milinkevich does is an attempt to 
create a new structure that is doomed to remain 
old in content, as it will be incapable of signing up 
new people and activists. 
Besides, the very idea of the ‘third force’, in this case 
a pro-European one, is not new in the Belarusian 
political reality. Suffice it to remember that in 
2005-2006, before and during the 2006 presidential 
campaign, Alexander Kozulin set up a movement 
‘Volya Naroda’ (‘The Will of the People’), which was 
to become an alternative both to the opposition and 
the authorities. Eventually this endeavor failed.
The political alienation from the poles of the au-
thorities and the opposition had always seemed 
tempting to those oppositionists who tried to act 
independently. However, such alienation has never 
brought tangible political success and has remained 
but a temporary endeavor used to promote a presi-
dential candidate. One has to bear in mind the fact 
that for the majority of the population as well as 
the authorities any alternative to A. Lukashenka 
is regarded as oppositional, whatever its name. 
Likewise, the opposition regards such alternative 
exclusively as an initiative of the authorities.  In this 
way any ‘third force’ created artificially turns alien 
and unacceptable for either political camp.
Nevertheless one may discern a certain peculiarity 
in the initiative put forward by A. Milinkevich. The 
congress of pro-European forces (possibly followed 
by establishment of a ‘pro-European movement’ is 
broader ideologically and is not loaded with a spe-
cific political direction, i.e. it does not posit the need 
to democratize Belarus as its goal. The fundamental 
idea is ‘Europeanisation’ of Belarus avoiding radical 
political modifications. It is on these grounds that 
the Belarusian authorities currently base themselves 
in their pursuit to reach Europe without the political 
transformation of the authoritarian system. For the 
regime a dialogue with Europe warrants a certain 
stability and safety. Moreover, it is obvious that by 
acknowledging the absence of internal alternatives 
and possibility to make political changes the West 
has ventured upon a comprehensive dialogue 
with the Belarusian regime. As the status of the 
opposition weakened significantly in the West, 
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A. Milinkevich has taken a very convenient and 
beneficial stand due to several reasons. 
First, given the conflict with Russia and the stance 
of the regime, A. Milinkevich’s movement and the 
EU are getting closer to each other. A. Milinkevich’s 
initiative fits ideally the general European political 
climate with respect to the existing Belarusian 
regime. Given the great disillusionment with the 
actions and state of affairs within the opposition the 
West has started approaching the regime, which 
has significantly diminished the role the opposition 
played as the only foreign policy actor. Favouring 
constructive relations between the West and Bela-
rus, A. Milinkevich reserves the right to be one of 
the significant political actors for the West due to 
the fact that his rhetoric conforms to the rhetoric 
and policy of the EU. 
Second, the convocation of the congress and a pos-
sible organization of the ‘pro-European movement’ 
put the opposition parties into an embarrassing situ-
ation. For, following a banal logic, if the opposition 
does not support the idea of the establishment of 
such ‘pro-European’ movement and refrains from 
taking part in the congress, it will be automati-
cally regarded as making a stand against the idea 
of ‘European Belarus’. Thus representatives of the 
Belarusian opposition find themselves in narrow 
circumstances. On the one hand, they cannot avoid 
taking part in this congress and, therefore, the move-
ment. On the other hand they cannot participate 
in it. For if they do, they will tacitly acknowledge 
A. Milinkevich’s leadership and headship, while 
refraining from participation they highlight their 
‘non-European’ nature. Even if they do participate 
in this process, representatives of the UDF will 
most likely do this under an apparent pressure 
from Western partners.
However, A. Milinkevich’s steps will not influence 
the factual political situation in the country. The 
split of the opposition will remain unchanged. 
One may already envisage at least four candidates 
for the forthcoming presidential elections in 2011. 
These are A. Milinkevich, A. Sannikov, S. Kaliakin, 
and A. Lebedko. Given the growing tension and 
conflict between the representatives of the oppo-
sitional movement, A. Lukashenka’s position will 
only be strengthened. Even as a sole candidate A. 
Milinkevich does not constitute a real threat for 
the political regime as was demonstrated by the 
elections in 2006. Neither does he present a threat 
for the regime as one of the leaders of the opposi-
tion for he is incapable of uniting all oppositional 
forces around himself.  A. Milinkevich annoys 
and displeases the rest of the opposition since he 
enjoys great trust of the West, which readily sup-
ports and finances his projects rather than those 
of his opponents. For ideologically the former are 
closer to the kind of the policy the EU is currently 
implementing with respect to Belarus. 
Under these conditions one can hardly assert the 
existence of an agreement between A. Milinkevich 
and the political regime, since the latter faces nei-
ther internal nor external threats. The opposition 
is weak, largely disunited and does not constitute 
a real political force. The West and the EU in par-
ticular are open for collaboration with the regime, 
despite the resentment of the opposition.
A. Milinkevich has comfortably merged with the 
formed environment, which is also beneficial for 
the authorities, as it creates additional pressure 
inside the oppositional camp.
 If one assumes that there is an agreement between 
A. Lukashenka and A. Milinkevich and the latter’s 
loyalty can be bribed by a good seat or a formal and 
meaningless post, it only provides evidence to the 
fact that no one in the present-day opposition posits 
any serious goals. Realizing their weakness and 
inutility they therefore seek to get at least a small bit 
of the power pie. Moreover, this means that there 
is no serious opposition in Belarus whatsoever and 
that if an agreement had indeed been made, it was 
not made in the present time. This means that A. 
Milinkevich has been a controlled figure from the 
outset, which is also supported by the fact that the 
regime has total control over the entire oppositional 
movement. In these circumstances the existence of 
an independent political force is impossible. 
Moreover, A. Lukashenka is not a leader who is 
ready to share posts, even if they are insignificant. 
In addition, one should realize that in authoritar-
ian societies the post itself may mean nothing in 
the practical sense, yet as a symbol it may evoke 
absolutely unexpected reactions. This primarily 
would mean that A. Milinkevich is a strong leader 
indeed, and the authorities are afraid of him if it 
entered into an agreement. In the authoritarian 
regime even a minor concession, a post for the 
‘bought’ oppositionist may be pointing to the 
weakness of the system and strength of the op-
position, as the regime has to make concessions 
to an insignificant leader. As the last elections to 
the House of Representatives, demonstrated, the 
hopes that certain ‘loyal’ oppositionists would be 
elected into the Parliament did not come true. 
Therefore, even if some agreements do exist, the 
regime will act solely in its own interests and play 
by its own rules.
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‘The project of 
Liberalizers is to 
relax social tension 
and to strengthen 
their position in 
the power bloc by 
broadening the 
social base of the 
regime: to allow 
some autonomous 
organization of the 
civil society and 
to incorporate the 
new groups into 
the authoritarian 
institutions’.
Sergey Nikoliuk, Political Analyst
Since late 2008 the word ‘liberalization’ has been 
often heard in Belarus. Again, since in 2001, on the 
eve of the second presidential elections and some 
time after their close, ‘the only Belarusian politician’1 
was already raising the issue of liberalization, but 
then it remained but an issue discussed. Today the 
authorities have moved from something on mind 
to something in kind, although many independent 
experts have not yet started to regard this transition 
seriously. Such resistance may be due to the fact 
that experts are attempting to discover the first 
outcomes of liberalization on the political field, 
while the authorities seek to place their innovations 
exclusively within the economic framework, and 
so far have been successful. 
In addition, there is also a problem of the descrip-
tion language. At the heart of the matter is the fact 
that the majority of Belarusian experts understand 
Belarus exclusively from the perspective of Western 
political science. However, attempts at describing 
Belarusian reality by applying terminology bor-
rowed from another culture cannot be efficient. On 
many occasions the author of the present article 
has been accused of insisting on the development 
of a special Belarusian political science. Yet this 
is indeed true. To justify myself I will turn to the 
authority of Emile Durkheim who, by asserting 
that there are only ‘societies’, and each one of them 
should be viewed as a separate species, has denied 
‘the society’ the right to exist.
To illustrate the language problem let us consider 
specific examples. To do that we shall turn to what 
at first sight seems like a univocal concept, e. g., the 
concept ‘state’. In all major European languages the 
word ‘state’ sounds the same: state, Staat, etat, stati, 
esta-do (from Latin ‘status’).
As for the origins and the nature of the state, very 
significant observations have been made by Schmidt: 
’State’ is an individual, specific, phenomenon deter-
mined temporarily, which should be dated within 
the epoch between the 16th and 20th centuries, and 
which had emerged from these four centuries, 
from Renaissance, Humanism, Restoration, and 
Counter-Restoration… The state is primarily an 
outcome of a religious civil war, its negotiation by 
means of neutralization and secularization of the 
confessional fronts’2. 
1 On July 27, 2000, addressing his minions during a teleconfer-
ence, President A.Lukashenko asserted literally the following: 
‘There is only one politician in Belarus! It’s me!’  
 
2 Cited from an article by Y.Pivovarov Mezhdu kazachestvom i 
knutom. K stoletiju russkoj konstitucii i russkogo parlamenta 
<Between the Cossacks and the Whip. To Commemorate Rus-
sian Constitution and Russian Parliament>. Polis, No. 2, 2006. 
Let us now have a look at the etymology of the Rus-
sian word for ‘state’, or ‘gosudarstvo’. It absolutely 
clearly reveals the essence of the economic relations 
that formed in the past on the territory of the Rus-
sian Empire. The word conceals a different (non-
European) way of development, which ultimately 
resulted in the formation of a different society. 
Thus ‘go’ is the first syllable of the word ‘gospodin’ 
(‘lord’), ‘su’- is the first ancient form of address in 
Russia (hence ‘sudar’, or ‘sir’), and ‘darstvo’ – ‘to 
donate’. In this way the term ‘gosudarstvo’ itself 
refers to a structure of economy based on service 
and distributing, and markedly different from the 
market structure, based on commodity-money 
relations.
It is little wonder that the word ‘liberalization’ evokes 
similar translation difficulties. Let us now turn to 
Adam Przeworski, American political scientist of 
Polish descent: ‘The project of Liberalizers is to relax 
social tension and to strengthen their position in 
the power bloc by broadening the social base of the 
regime: to allow some autonomous organization of 
the civil society and to incorporate the new groups 
into the authoritarian institutions’3. 
With respect to Belarus, it is clear that there can be 
no ‘new groups’ of the civil society which the author-
ity would ‘allow some autonomous organization’ in 
order to incorporate them into the authoritarian 
institutions. Only private persons were invited 
to the Social Consultative Council created under 
President’s Administration in spring 2009. The 
absence of representatives from parties and social 
organizations in the Council is yet other evidence 
to the fact that the authorities are not ready to have 
any relations with oppositional structures. Therefore 
one should acknowledge the rectitude of many 
Belarusian experts who state that liberalization, 
as understood in the Western terms (following 
Przeworski), is not taking place in Belarus.
To understand the direction where the ‘Belarusian 
economic model of development’4 is moving, its ori-
gin must be defined. Since the origin could be hardly 
found in the market economy based on the acts of 
purchase and sale, let us turn for assistance to the 
theory of a state with ‘razdatok-economy’ by Olga 
Bessonova, Russian social scientist5. She has shown 
that the total of ‘collections’ (Rus. ‘sdacha’) (natural 
and financial collections from the population and 
3 Przeworski, A. Democracy and the market. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991. p. 57. 
 
4 Speech by President А. Lukashenko delivered at the final ple-
nary meeting of the permanent seminar of high personnel from 
republican and local state bodies, 22.03.2002, http://www.pres-
ident.gov.by/press13375.print.html.  
5  Bessonova О. Razdatochnaya ekonomika Rossii. Evoliuciya che-
rez transformacii, М.: ROSSPEN, 2006. 
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Based on the acts 
of collection and 
distribution, the 
economy may only 
be centralized. It is 
incompatible with 
private ownership.
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execution of compulsory services) combined with 
the total of ‘distributions’ (Rus. ‘razdacha’), i.e., 
salaries, pensions, benefits and privileges, form 
the basic structure of the state-society. 
Based on the acts of collection and distribution, the 
economy may only be centralized. It is incompatible 
with private ownership. One must not be mislead 
by the existence of relevant articles in the Consti-
tution. Belarusian economic and social reality is 
regulated not by the Constitution, but rather by the 
opinions of the Head of the State. ‘It is always easier 
to deal with a private trader. You tell him – he will 
do it. This is because otherwise he risks to lose his 
property’6. In other words, in Belarus property may 
only be bound with service, i.e. individual citizens 
are granted an opportunity to use it on condition 
that they serve the state.
A. Lukashenka believes that his main merit as 
President is the creation of ‘a strong state’. At this 
point, however, we face another language problem. 
The strength of the Belarusian state is not in its 
6 Press-conference of President A. Lukash-
enka, http://pda.sb.by/post/37595/. 
ability to develop rules of living together in a state 
and ensure the compliance of all economic and 
political subjects with these rules, but rather in the 
share of material resources which the state man-
ages to locate in the budget with a view to further 
centralized allocation. 
Table 1 clearly depicts the outcomes of the construc-
tion of a strong state under the leadership of the 
first Belarusian President. One should pay attention 
to the leap that took place in 2003. It is related to 
the beginning of activities of ‘the Belarusian oil 
offshore’ which emerged due to the processing 
of cheap Russian oil. In full accordance with the 
essence of the razdatok-based state all additional 
income entered the state pantry for further dis-
tribution. The dynamics of movement of Belarus 
with respect to the Corruption Perceptions Index 
depicts the extent to which the distribution is suc-
cessful (see table).
Income and Corruption Perception Index
95 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Budget incomes 
(percentage from GDP) 29 34 33 33 44 47 47 48 50 51
Place with respect to the Corruption 
Perception Index* - - - 36 53 74 151
*According to Transparency International data
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